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Introduction 
An examination of the implications of enlargement for the existing member states of the Union must 
include an assessment of the response of the mass of the citizens to the proposed enlargement and an 
assessment of what this response implies in terms of the challenge of consolidating the legitimacy of 
the Union. In order to provide the necessary background for a discussion of these issues, this paper 
begins with a brief survey of trends in attitudes to European integration, paying particular attention to 
indicators of the nature and quality of orientations to integration. It then deals with preferences 
regarding the enlargement process and the priority attached to it, with people's expectations of the 
consequences that enlargement will have, with the structure of preferences regarding the admission of 
a range of applicant and potential applicant countries and with the degree to which European publics 
have a sense of being on top of the issue and of participating in a debate about enlargement. 
Trends in Support for Integration 
The essential features of long-term trends in orientations to European integration can be illustrated by 
reference to three indicators, now widely referred to as the membership indicator, the benefits 
indicator and the dissolution indicator.
1 The first of these indicators asks whether the respondent thinks 
that his or her country's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither/nor. 
The benefits indicator asks whether the respondent thinks the country has benefited or not from 
membership of the Union and the dissolution question elicits responses to the situation of a 
hypothetical dissolution of the Union (‘if you were told in the morning that the European Union had 
been scrapped…’). Figure 1 presents the pro-integration responses based on these three indicators and 
also adds a line to indicate the proportion who give either an indifferent or a don't know response to 
the dissolution question. 
The main point to emerge from even a brief examination of the trends considered in Figure 1 is the 
responsiveness of public opinion to events and developments in the Union. Support for integration was 
either static or declining during what is often referred to as the doldrums period of European 
integration, i.e. the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s and then showed a remarkable and sustained rise 
from the early 1980s to 1990. Our main interest in the present context however, centres on the marked 
decline in support for integration since 1991. This is clearly evident in the membership indicator and is 
mirrored in the benefits indicator. Both indicators do show a slight and rather bumpy increase since 
the mid-1990s but these recent trends still leave us with an approximately 20 percentage point fall in 
support for integration over the last decade. The third indicator (dissolution) shows a fall of similar 
size in the early 1990s. Positive responses to this question can be interpreted as a measure of 
enthusiasm for integration. It is significant, therefore, that, over the entire period for which data are 
available, support for integration on this measure has been lower than on the other two indicators 
considered. The dissolution indicator also points to a particularly important trend, i.e. the growth in 
indifference to integration. Since the early 1990s ‘indifferent’ plus ‘don't know’ responses to the 
dissolution question have consistently outstripped ‘very sorry’ responses, culminating in an almost 30 
percentage point deficit in enthusiasm relative to indifference/don't know in 2001. The fact that a 
majority of European citizens are either indifferent to the future of the European Union or don't know 
what view to take on the matter is a particularly important feature of the background against which 
contemporary attitudes to enlargement must be assessed. 
                                                      
1   For a detailed discussion of these indicators and of the format of the questions see Oskar Niedermayer (1995) ‘Trends 
and Contrasts’ in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.) Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, 
pp.53-57. Oxford University Press.   Richard Sinnott 
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For and Against Enlargement 
On a very summary measure (for or against enlargement of the European Union to include new 
countries), a majority of European citizens in autumn 2002 were in favour of enlargement, one in six 
had no opinion and close to one-third were opposed (see Figure 2). The range of attitudes across the 
existing member states was quite considerable, going from 45 per cent opposed in France to between 
14 and 17 per cent opposed in Spain, Ireland and Greece. 
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A subsequent question in the same survey brought out a more nuanced picture by offering the 
alternatives of enlargement to include all the countries wishing to join, enlargement to include only 
some of the countries wishing to join and the third alternative ‘the EU should not be enlarged to any 
additional countries.’ The results show 20 per cent in favour of a comprehensive enlargement (all 
countries wishing to join), 46 per cent in favour of conditional enlargement and only 19 per cent 
opposed to the admission of any additional countries to the Union (see Figure 3). The latter kind of 
outright opposition to enlargement was found among one-in-three people in France, among one-in-
four in Belgium and among one-in-five in Germany, Austria and the UK. The lowest levels of outright 





Source: EB58.1, Q.26.4 Richard Sinnott 
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Figure 3  Enlargement preference (include all/some/none) by country (in descending order of 
















The Priority Attached to Enlargement 
As well as looking at the balance of opinion for and against an issue like enlargement, it is important 
to take account of the priority that citizens attach to the issue. The evidence from the autumn of 2002 
suggests that, relative to a wide-ranging list of possible actions the EU might undertake, welcoming 
new member countries ranks at the very bottom of the scale of priorities and is a substantial distance 
adrift of the next lowest priority. Thirty-one per cent regard welcoming new member countries as a 
priority action; 58 per cent say it is not a priority; this compares to the next lowest priority of 
reforming the institutions of the EU (52 per cent regard this as a priority while 32 per cent consider 
that it is not a priority (see Table 1). 
Further clarification of attitudes to EU priorities and of the place of the enlargement issue among 
such priorities can be gained by pushing the analysis of the priority action data in Table 1 a bit further. 
This can be done by employing an exploratory statistical technique that is widely used to identify the 
broad dimensions that may underlie responses to a large number of attitude items such as those 
contained in Table 1.
2 The outcome of such an analysis in this case suggests that there are two 
attitudinal dimensions underlying the priority responses. Taking into account the size of the factor 
                                                      
2   Factor analysis examines the relationships or associations between a given set of variables (in this case the responses to 
the questionnaire items) in order to discover the common 'factors' or dimensions underlying the pattern of responses. The 
first thing to be decided in a factor analysis is the number of factors or dimensions that best account for the patterns in the 
data. This decision is made in the light of a number of statistical criteria while taking into account also the interpretability 
of the factors. The interpretation of the factors or dimensions is based on the contribution of each variable (questionnaire 
item) to the factor as indicated by the magnitude of the factor ‘loading’ for that item (shown in the factor analysis tables 
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loadings in Table 2, the first underlying dimension might be summarily described as a ‘problem 
priorities’ dimension (with high loadings on terrorism, organised crime, unemployment, police and 
security, quality of food products, poverty and social exclusion, consumer protection, illegal 
immigration, and the environment). The second dimension comprises a range of actions that focus on 
European integration as such (asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU, reforming 
the institutions of the EU, welcoming new member countries, getting closer to European citizens, and 
successfully implementing the single currency). This second dimension can be described as an 
‘integration priorities’ dimension. The key point in the present context is that enlargement is bracketed 
with these integration priorities rather than with the series of high-profile problem priorities that arise 
from the need to confront the various difficulties and threats that preoccupy the citizens of the Union. 
In short, enlargement is a low priority issue associated with aspirations to greater European integration 
rather than with the challenge of finding solutions to pressing problems. 
Table 1  Priority attached to actions to be taken by the European Union, Autumn 2002 
 
Priority Not  a  priority DK 
Fighting terrorism  91.4  5.5  3.1 
Maintaining peace and security in Europe  91.2 5.6  3.2 
Fighting unemployment  90.6  6.3  3.1 
Fighting poverty and social exclusion  89.8  6.6  3.6 
Fighting organised crime an drug trafficking  88.9  7.6  3.5 
Protecting the environment  87.5  8.9  3.6 
Guaranteeing the quality of food products  86.1  10.3  3.6 
Fighting illegal immigration  84.1  11.4  4.5 
Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products  82.1  13.5  4.3 
Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of 
democracy in Europe 
80.6 12.6  6.8 
Getting closer to European citizens  71.1  21.2  7.7 
Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro 63.0  29.7  7.3 
Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the 
world 
54.7 34.2  11.1 
Reforming the institutions of the EU and the way they work  52.2  32.4  15.4 
Welcoming new member countries  30.9  58.0  11.1 
Source: EB58.1, Q.27 
It might be argued that the attitudes considered so far—in favour or against enlargement 
and regarding enlargement as a priority or not—are now of little consequence. Enlargement is 
a done deal and the view might be taken that people had simply better get used to it. This is a 
simplistic view. If significant numbers of people have reservations about enlargement and if 
only one-in-three European citizens regard it as a priority, it is essential to examine the 
reasons for these doubts about and apathy towards the issue. A better understanding of what 
lies behind these attitudes should, at a minimum, help in addressing them. 
Probing the possible reasons behind these attitudes can be approached by examining the 
expectations people have regarding the consequences of enlargement. This paper looks at two sets of 
such expectations—a set of specific perceptions of the consequences and implications of enlargement 
and, secondly, a set of expectations regarding winners and losers from the enlargement process.  Richard Sinnott 
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Table 2 Two dimensions underlying EU priorities: ‘problem priorities’ and ‘integration 










      
Fighting terrorism  0.731   
Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking  0.712   
Fighting unemployment  0.683   
Maintaining peace and security in Europe  0.672   
Guaranteeing the quality of food products  0.663   
Fighting poverty and social exclusion  0.661   
Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products  0.635   
Fighting illegal immigration  0.619   
Protecting the environment  0.595   
Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of 












Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the 
world 
0.205   0.694
Reforming the institutions of EU and the way they work  0.130   0.693
Welcoming new member countries  -0.039   0.633
Getting closer to European citizens  0.277   0.594
Successfully implementing the single European currency. the euro  0.182   0.546
% Variance  35.291    10.388 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Source: EB58.1, Q.27 
Expected Consequences of Enlargement 
Expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement vary considerably—from well over two-
thirds of the citizens who anticipate that enlargement will make the European Union more important in 
the world to a similar proportion who believe that it will make it more difficult to make decisions in 
the European Union. In attempting to understand the implications of these and related views of the 
consequences of enlargement, it is again instructive to examine the structure underlying the 
expectations. A factor analysis (Table 4) suggests that there are three dimensions underlying the 
expectations listed in Table 3. The first dimension comprises four items measuring expected 
disadvantages of enlargement (that one's own country will become less important, one's own country 
will receive less financial aid, there will be more unemployment in one's own country and decision-
making in the EU will become more difficult). As we have seen in Table 3, endorsement of these 
negative expectations ranges from a high of 68 per cent (difficulty of making decisions) to a low of 
43/44 per cent (country become less important and more unemployment in own country). A second 
dimension is defined by the three items measuring expected advantages. These are the importance of 
the EU in the world, cultural enrichment, and peace and security. Overall, these expected advantages 
are somewhat more widely endorsed than the expected disadvantages—expected advantages range 
from a high of 69 per cent (Europe more important in the world) to a low of 55 per cent (more peace 
and security). It is, however, quite striking that these expected advantages are a good deal more 
intangible than the very tangible negative aspects that comprise the first dimension of expectations. Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/11 © 2004 Richard Sinnott  7 
Table 3  Expectations/perceptions regarding enlargement, Autumn 2002 
  Expectation/perception regarding enlargements 
  Positive Negative DK 
Importance of EU in the world  69.4  16.2  14.4 
Cultural enrichment of Europe  66.0  19.3  14.8 
Need for EU institutional reform  59.2  13.2  27.6 
Peace and security in Europe 54.9  31.2  13.9 
Importance of country in Europe  41.1  43.8  15.1 
Employment in own country  38.3  42.7  19.0 
EU help for future member countries 
financially. even before they join  33.4 50.1  16.6 
Cost of enlargement for existing member 
countries  24.5 57.7  17.8 
Financial aid for own country from EU  23.1  56.9  20.0 
Making decisions on a European scale  19.1  67.9  13.0 
Source: EB58.1. Q.43 
The third dimension underlying expectations of the consequences of enlargement comprises two 
cost-related items—the expectation of an additional financial burden and the willingness to make 
financial transfers to applicant countries). As is clear from Table 3, attitudes to the financial aspects of 
enlargement tend to be negative – only 25 per cent feel that there will be no additional costs 
involved while 58 per cent believe that enlargement will cost more for existing member 
countries. Furthermore, only one-third endorse the proposition that the EU should help future 
member countries financially before they join. 
Table 4: Three dimensions underlying attitudes to enlargement: manifest costs, intangible 
benefits and expectations, Autumn 2002 










Country will become less important in Europe  0.704   -0.182    0.107 
Country will receive less financial aid from 
EU  0.691    0.079    -0.146 
There will be more unemployment in country  0.666   -0.269    0.058 
It will be much more difficult to make 
decisions on a European scale  0.545    0.098    -0.390 
The EU will be more important in the world  -0.087    0.762   0.066 
Europe will be culturally richer  -0.091    0.730   0.082 
More peace and security will be guaranteed in 
Europe  -0.153    0.616    0.307 
Enlargement will not cost more for existing 
member countries  -0.104    0.034    0.744 
The EU should help future member countries 
financially. even before they join  0.057    0.233    0.649 
The EU must reform the way its institutions 
work before welcoming new members  0.362    0.437    -0.095 
          
%  Variance  23.546   16.228   10.601 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Source: EB58.1, Q.43 
The Eurobarometer data also make it possible to examine the expected gains and losses affecting 
various groups and sectors in society as a result of enlargement (see Table 5). The question regarding 
winners and losers takes account of eleven groups and shows fairly widespread agreement on three Richard Sinnott 
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groups that are expected to lose out as a result of enlargement (farmers, fishermen and small 
companies). At the other end of the scale there is a widespread consensus that big business will benefit 
from enlargement and that young people will, by and large, also be beneficiaries.  
Table 5 Groups perceived as losing out/benefiting as a result of enlargement, Autumn 2002 
  Lose out  Benefit  Neither lose out nor 
benefit 
Farmers 51.7  18.9  29.3 
Fishermen 49.4  14.7  35.9 
Small companies  40.8  21.0  38.1 
The unemployed  33.2  14.9  51.9 
People living in the countryside  32.2  13.9  53.9 
Employees in general  31.0  22.1  46.9 
Old people  29.4  13.2  57.4 
Young people  19.9  46.0  34.0 
Ethnic minorities  19.8  32.3  47.9 
People living in big cities  17.1  26.8  56.1 
Big businesses  9.4  67.3  23.4 
Source: EB58.1, Q.46 
A factor analysis of these data (Table 6) suggests that there are two dimensions underlying the 
expectations of gains and losses from enlargement. The two dimensions point to a broad distinction 
between traditional sectors or social groups and modern sectors or groups. Thus the first dimension 
(traditional) is defined by expectations in regard to the outcome for fishermen, farmers, people living 
in the countryside, small companies and old people. The second (modern) dimension is defined by 
expectations regarding the effect of enlargement on young people, urban dwellers, big businesses, 
ethnic minorities and employees. It should be noted that there is some overlap between the two 
dimensions in regard to old people, employees in general (possibly because of the very unspecific 
definition of this social group) and the unemployed. Bearing the distribution of the responses to each 
of these individual items as shown in Table 5 in mind, the general expectation seems to be that 
traditional groups or sectors will experience the drawbacks while the rewards accrue to more modern 
social and economic sectors. 
The Boundaries of an Enlarged European Union 
Few debates about enlargement get very far or without encountering the issue of the ultimate 
boundaries of the Union. Figure 3 above showed that, for a majority of EU citizens, enlargement 
preferences are selective, i.e. some but not all applicant or aspirant countries should be admitted. Table 
7 spells out the implications of such selectivity by showing the level of support for each of 21 
countries ‘becoming part of the European Union in the future’.
3 The level of support for these 
countries becoming part of the EU ranges very widely—from 75 per cent in the case of 
Switzerland and Norway to 27 per cent in the case of Albania. Apart from the distinctiveness 
of Switzerland and Norway and, to a lesser extent, Iceland, there are no obvious gaps in the 
ranking of countries that would suggest a clear sub-division into a group of countries whose 
membership is favourably regarded and a group of countries whose membership is not so 
regarded. Thus, on the evidence in Table 7, the subjective or psychological boundaries of an 
enlarged Europe, as seen from within the existing member states, are decidedly fuzzy. A 
factor analysis of the data is more helpful in this regard, suggesting a sub-division of potential 
new members into three regional groups, with fairly minimal overlap between them. 
                                                      
3   Notwithstanding the fact that some of the countries concerned do not currently aspire to membership. Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective 
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Table 6 Two dimensions underlying perceptions of group benefits/losses resulting from 
enlargement: traditional and modern demographic/socio-economic sectors, Autumn 2002 
   Component 






       
Fishermen  0.858  0.027 
Farmers  0.844  0.026 
People living in the countryside  0.646  0.339 
Small companies  0.550  0.304 
Old people  0.500  0.464 
Young people    0.225   0.727
People living in big cities    0.220   0.675
Big businesses    -0.132   0.627
Ethnic minorities    0.228   0.594
Employees in general   0.504    0.551
The unemployed    0.385   0.460
% Variance    39.283    12.156 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization  
Source: EB58.1, Q.46 
Table 7 In favour of or against EU membership for particular countries in the future, Autumn 
2002 
  In favour  Against  DK 
Norway 74.9  11.9  13.2 
Switzerland 74.9  12.4  12.7 
Iceland 61.2  20.9  17.9 
Malta 52.4  27.9  19.7 
Hungary 51.5  30.0  18.6 
Poland 48.0  33.7  18.3 
Cyprus 47.0  32.5  20.4 
Czech Republic  46.3  33.2  20.4 
Slovakia 41.1  37.3  21.6 
Estonia 41.0  36.4  22.7 
Latvia 40.6  36.6  22.8 
Lithuania 40.0  37.1  22.9 
Bulgaria 38.8  39.7  21.5 
Slovenia 37.8  39.9  22.3 
Croatia 35.1  44.5  20.4 
Romania 35.0  44.9  20.2 
Yugoslavia (Federal Republic)  32.7  46.4  20.9 
Turkey 31.7  48.8  19.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  31.2  47.3  21.5 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM)  30.0 48.0 22.1 
Albania 27.2  51.8  21.0 
Source: EB58.1, Q.41 and Q.42 
The first group identified by the factor analysis comprises eight of the ten countries that have just 
successfully concluded accession negotiations with the EU (see Table 8).
4 Since the two countries that 
                                                      
4   Note that, to a much greater extent that in the other factor analyses reported in this paper, the first dimension dominates 
the factor structure. This is indicated by the fact that, as reported in Table 8, the first factor explains 62.8 per cent of the Richard Sinnott 
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have successfully concluded negotiations but are not included in this group are Malta and Cyprus, this 
dimension or grouping of countries makes up a contiguous Central European region stretching on a 
north-east to south-west line from Estonia to Slovenia. The second region or grouping of countries 
identified by the factor analysis in Table 8 comprises the countries of South-Eastern Europe—
stretching from Croatia and Serbia in the North-West to Turkey in the South-East. 
The third regional grouping consists of a set of countries that are not geographically contiguous but 
have a clear political similarity. The grouping is defined principally by Norway, Switzerland and 
Iceland, with Malta and Cyprus included in the grouping but with more modest loadings (see Table 8). 
What these countries have in common, relative to all but one (Turkey) of the countries in the first two 
groupings, is that they were not part of Eastern Europe as this term was defined in a cold-war context. 
Accordingly, with some stretching of the strictly geographical meaning of the term, this third group of 
countries can be labelled Western European. 
Table 8 Dimensions underlying enlargement preferences (21 countries): South-Eastern Europe, 








 (3)  Western 
Europe 
         
Latvia  0.831  0.334    0.227 
Lithuania  0.823  0.353    0.218 
Estonia  0.823  0.330    0.235 
Slovakia  0.729  0.437    0.241 
Czech Republic  0.707  0.370    0.308 
Hungary  0.697  0.343    0.361 
Slovenia  0.686   0.530   0.193 
Poland  0.683  0.405    0.303 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM)  0.372  0.840    0.156 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.392  0.819   0.157 
Yugoslavia (Federal Republic)  0.371  0.814   0.180 
Albania 0.307  0.810   0.168 
Croatia 0.406  0.787   0.180 
Turkey 0.201  0.689   0.238 
Romania  0.550  0.639   0.169 
Bulgaria  0.552  0.585   0.237 
Norway 0.229    0.124    0.869
Switzerland 0.132    0.127    0.856
Iceland 0.385    0.245    0.684
Malta  0.483   0.383    0.516
Cyprus 0.426    0.451    0.461
         
%  Variance  62.836   8.100   5.106 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Source: EB58.1, Q.41 and Q.42 
Not surprisingly, there is some overlap between the three regions identified in Table 8. Also not 
surprisingly, the countries that give rise to the overlap lie on the borders of the regions as defined.
5 
Thus Slovenia, while belonging primarily to the Central European region as defined in Table 8, also 
(Contd.)                                                                   
variance. However, although the other two factors are therefore of considerably less importance in a statistical sense, they 
do meet the eigenvalue-equals-one criterion and they do form quite distinct and interpretable dimensions. 
5   An overlap is considered to occur if country has a factor loading above 0.45 on more than one dimension in Table 8. Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective 
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has a not insubstantial loading on the dimension identifying a South-Eastern European region. 
Conversely, Romania and Bulgaria, which on the basis of the factor loadings belong primarily to the 
South-Eastern European region, also have a non-negligible loading on the Central European 
dimension. Finally Malta and Cyprus also show some overlap or ambiguity. While Malta loads 
primarily on the Western European dimension it also has a loading above the cut-off point on the 
Central European dimension. Cyprus figures on two dimensions and comes close to figuring on all 
three—its highest loading is on the Western European dimension but it has an almost equally high 
loading on the South-Eastern European dimension while coming close to having a loading above the 
cut-off point also on the Central European dimension. 
It could perhaps be argued that the distinction between Central and South-Eastern Europe as 
outlined here in fact reflects the current state of accession negotiations—after all the countries that 
define the Central European region in Table 8 are not only geographically contiguous but also share 
the immediate and certain prospect of membership of the EU. However, the non-inclusion of Malta 
and Cyprus in this group argues against the interpretation that the regional groupings identified are 
simply a reflection of current negotiation/application status. A more fundamental problem for any 
interpretation that would regard the regional distinctions identified here as simply a reflection of the 
negotiation process is that, as we shall see in a moment, the publics of the existing member states do 
not follow enlargement issues closely enough or do not feel sufficiently well-informed about 
enlargement to warrant the assumption that they are aware of the details of which countries are about 
to be included and which countries are on a negotiation/waiting list. It seems more reasonable to 
conclude, therefore, that the regional groupings identified here reflect political or cultural familiarities 
and/or affinities rather than simply reflecting the current state of membership negotiations with the 
countries concerned.  
The findings just reported enable one to go back to the ranking of countries in Table 7 with a better 
sense of the structure underlying the preferences expressed. Broadly speaking, public opinion in the 
existing 15 member states responds to the possibilities of enlargement in terms of different degrees of 
support for membership of countries in three distinct regions. Average support for admission to 
membership of the EU of the countries here labelled Western European is 62 per cent, for the 
countries in the Central European region it is 43 per cent and for the countries in the South-Eastern 
European region it is 33 per cent. Two points should be noted about the differences between these 
average levels of support. In the first place, the fact that the average level of support for the admission 
of the countries of Central Europe that make up the bulk of the current group of countries to be 
admitted is only 43 per cent does not imply that there is a majority opposed to enlargement. We have 
seen from Figures 2 and 3 that this is certainly not the case. What it does imply is that the citizens of 
the existing member states, while supportive of enlargement as such do not have a clear sense of 
welcoming individual new member states—as they would have if the Union where admitting Norway 
or Switzerland. In short, there is a considerable way to go if the accession countries are to be fully 
incorporated into an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. The second point suggested by the 
variations in average support for the admission of particular countries is that further progress in the 
enlargement of the European Union beyond the 2004 intake and in a south-eastern direction will 
require a process of communication and persuasion if it is to be done with the support of public 
opinion in the current 15 member states.
6 Some idea of the challenge that would be involved in 
mounting such a process of communication can be gleaned from considering how the debate about 
enlargement has been experienced (or not experienced) in the 15 existing member states. 
                                                      
6   Of course the composition of public opinion on enlargement issues will change significantly when the current round of 
enlargement takes effect in 2004 and any future debate about enlargement will be fundamentally affected by the fact that 
it will take place within a Union of 25 rather than a Union of 15.  Richard Sinnott 
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The Public's Involvement in the Enlargement Issue 
Figure 4 shows that, as of autumn 2002, a majority of EU citizens had been recently exposed to some 
communication about enlargement via the main medium of mass communication in contemporary 
European societies, namely television. The proportion experiencing some form of active engagement 
with the enlargement issue via reading about it in the newspaper is, however, only about one in 
three. When the criterion is the more demanding one of discussion of enlargement with 
relatives, friends or colleagues, the proportion falls to one in ten. The ranking of countries in 
descending order from left to right is based on taking the average of the three forms of 
communication shown in the table. While this ordering of countries is likely to be a heavily 
influenced by various aspects of each country's political culture and political processes, there 
is some suggestion in Figure 4 that exposure to the issue of enlargement is in part a function 
of geographical or geopolitical proximity to and involvement with the candidate countries.  
Figure 4 Recently read/seen/been told something about enlargement-daily newspapers, television 
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Source: EB58.1, Q.45 Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective 
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The limited impact of the communication process just described is reflected in the fact that more 
than 75 per cent of the citizens of the EU feel that they are either not at all well informed or not very 
well-informed about enlargement as compared to the one-in-five who feel either well-informed or very 
well informed (see Figure 5). This subjective sense of being well informed is significantly higher in 
Finland, Austria, and Denmark and significantly lower in Britain, Portugal, and Italy. 
Figure 5 Sense of being informed about enlargement (in descending order of very well plus well 
informed), Autumn 2002 
 
Using a more demanding criterion of degree of involvement with the enlargement issue, 
Eurobarometer 58 asked respondents ‘How much do you feel you are participating in the political 
debate about enlargement?’ This question produced significantly higher levels of don't know than the 
question about sense of being informed about the enlargement process considered in Figure 5. Perhaps 
the best way to look at responses to the question is to combine those who feel ‘not at all involved’ in 
such debate with those who feel ‘not very much involved’, in other words to focus on the lowest two 
points on what is essentially a four-point scale (the other responses on the scale were ‘a great deal’ and 
‘somewhat’). Looked at in this way, Figure 6 shows that three-quarters of respondents admit to having 
effectively no sense of participation in the debate about enlargement. This proportion ranges from 60 
per cent in Ireland with little of no sense of participation to 90 per cent in Greece. Accompanying 
Ireland at the lower end of the scale of non-involvement are Austria and the Netherlands while Britain 
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Figure 6 Sense of participating in political debate about enlargement (in descending order of a 
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The Irish case is instructive in this regard. The fact that it has the lowest level of explicit sense of 
non-participation in the debate about enlargement is due no doubt to the referendum process that was 
in full swing during the period in which the fieldwork for EB 58 was carried out. However, the Irish 
data can also be read as showing the limits of what even a referendum can accomplish. In the midst of 
a referendum campaign on the Treaty of Nice, 60 per cent of Irish people did not feel even somewhat 
involved in a political debate about enlargement. A further 20 per cent were uncertain about whether 
or not they were so involved and gave a don't know response. Judged by what is admittedly an ideal 
standard (that citizens should feel that they are participating in the political debate about enlargement), 
this suggests that it will be difficult to bring about any substantial improvement in the degree of citizen 
involvement in the enlargement process. Short of that ideal, however, something can and should be 
Source: EB58.1, Q.40 Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective 
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done about the extremely low levels of subjective sense of being informed about enlargement issues 
that are revealed by Eurobarometer 58.
7 
Conclusion 
The main conclusions to be drawn from this analysis can be briefly summarised. In the first place, 
evidence on attitude to enlargement must be seen in the context of modest levels of support for 
European integration and quite high levels of indifference. Secondly, however, opposition to 
enlargement it found among only a minority of the citizens of the existing member states. Thirdly, for 
the bulk of the citizens, enlargement is a low priority issue that is part of an integration-driven agenda 
rather than part of the problem-driven agenda that preoccupies both European citizens and European 
governments. Fourthly, the publics of the existing member states anticipate both positive and negative 
consequences of enlargement, the former tending to be more intangible and the latter. They also have 
expectations regarding winners and losers from the enlargement process, the former tending to be 
from the modern social and economic sector and the latter tending to be from traditional sectors. 
Fifthly, in terms of the admission of particular member-states now and in the future, the public shows 
some evidence of making a distinction between a Central European region and a South-Eastern 
European region and, if enlargement is to proceed beyond its present phase with the support of the 
publics of the existing member states, considerable debate and persuasion will be required. The 
evidence indicates, however, that such debate may be difficult to engender. Be that as it may, much 
can and needs to be done to improve the public's sense of understanding of the enlargement process. 
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7   Studies of attitudes and behaviour in the two Nice referendums in Ireland suggest that citizens' understanding of issues of 
this kind, or at least their sense that they understand the issues, can be substantially improved by effective communication 
and that such improvement can have positive effects on support for integration (as measured in the Irish case by voting 
decision in the second referendum) - see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl108_en.pdf and 
http://www.euireland.ie/news/Treatyof Nice(2)report.pdf 
 